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Protocols are those guidelines, which if we follow at the right moment, often allow us to keep 
the victims as safe as possible. I see them that way, they give us security. Subject 27 
Because if we limit ourselves to the knowledge that is taught inside the school and we do not 
have a know how based on experience, we work with our hands tied. Subject 14 
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ABSTRACT 
This study builds on successful episodes of improvisation in the prehospital emergency context 
to investigate how protocols can be articulated with unexpected events. An inductive approach 
shows that it is crucial for the flexible treatment of protocols to confront the disparity among 
mental models and the reality presented. Prehospital care practitioners accomplish this through 
benefit and harm assessment, risk assessment and resources attributes processes. Different types 
of unexpected events reflect in different improvisational processes: re-evaluation of cognitive 
resources, unrelated knowledge sources and re-interpretation of resources. Experience, 
resources, contextual factors and other operators are important factors in the decision process. 
Key words: protocols, sensemaking, adaptation, improvisation, contextual assessment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When prehospital care professionals assist victims of sudden illness or trauma, they have to 
combine different pieces of information into a pattern so they can formulate diagnostic 
hypotheses and perform the treatment. These routines are embedded in clinical guidelines and 
knowledge transfer mechanism for a standardized approach. However, these routines might 
happen in the presence of exceptional situations and unexpected events. These uncommon 
situations often result from an uncontrolled and typically unfavorable out-of-hospital 
environment, which is characterized by resources restrictions, distractions and often time 
pressure.  
Therefore, there is the need for adjustment of routines and mechanisms to the uniqueness of 
each situation. Health professionals have the autonomy and responsibility to provide 
individualized care for their patients, adjusting and providing treatment in response to such 
individual uniqueness (Vogus, Sutcliffe and Weick, 2010). This complementarity of 
circumstantial adjustment towards protocols is recognized by the professional class, which 
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commonly refers repertoire of these past adjustments as “outdoor experience”. For this reason, 
this may be the ideal empirical context to study how unexpected events trigger adaptions of 
protocol, and which are the processes that reflect critical thinking and improvisation. 
This investigation may bring important insights both for organizations in general, since 
improvisation is linked with adaptation and resilience (Weick, 1993; Grøtan, Størseth, Rø & 
Skjerve, 2008), and specifically for organizations that rely in institutional guidelines and 
protocols for daily operations. Research regarding improvisation in the computer industry 
(Brown and Heisenhardt, 1995) shows that firms with established routines are more likely to 
improvise. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prehospital care corresponds to a context that extensively relies both in clinical guidelines, such 
as protocols and algorithms, and organizational certifications. Like in the medicine field in 
general, professionals have the rules memorized through their professional training and 
education (Perrow 1986). However, the practical exigencies of the daily practice demand for 
adjustments in routines. Once again, this is common to the medical practice in general. 
Institutionalized guidelines are based in evidence-based medicine and accepted best practices 
that, in specific situations, may collide with individualized considerations and judgments made 
on the scene (Haidet, 2007). EBM guidelines are the result of the incorporation of evidence 
from clinical trials, and are supposed to guarantee the basis of doctor’s behaviors (practice) and 
the quality of care. However, these guidelines are oriented to ‘average cases’. Clinicians may 
be forced by the actual conditions of the patients to use different ‘pieces’ of knowledge 
embedded in protocols, combine them, or activate expertise and experience via intuition (Feder, 
1999; Nicolini, 2010). 
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Improvisation has been studied as an unplanned but intentional response to unexpected and 
unpredictable events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). In emergency medicine, unexpectedness is a 
constant and professionals must deal with it.  
Previous research proposes that “physicians must be skilled improvisers’ in order effectively 
to handle patients’ unique idiosyncrasies as deviations from the ‘average case’”. (Haidet, 
2007). 
The definition of improvisation has been evolving from an adaptation perspective, as defined 
by Berliner (1994): “flexible treatment of preplanned material” to a spontaneous process in 
which intuition guides action: “Thinking and doing unfold simultaneously” (Weick, 1996). 
More recently, Cunha, Cunha and Kamoche (1999) aggregate some previous perspectives and 
introduce the domain of organization, presenting the concept of organizational improvisation: 
“The conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization and/or its members, drawing on 
available material, cognitive, affective and social resources.” 
Improvisation has been classified according to levels of improvisational activity. According to 
Weick (1998), variations in improvisation can be ‘embellishments’, where the plan is reshaped 
but still recognizable, ‘variations’ where unplanned actions are added but the relationship with 
the original plan is clear, or ‘improvisation’ when there are radical departures from plans. In 
more recent studies however, improvisation concept is applied in a broader way.  
Additionally, improvisation has been classified according to types of improvisation. Moorman 
and Miner propose a set of categories organized in tensions: collective against individual 
improvisation, product improvisation against process improvisations and behavioral against 
cognitive improvisations (Moorman and Miner 1998b). 
There are other relevant concepts, such as the ‘minimal structures’ proposed by Kamoche and 
Cunha (2001), which is divided in social and technical structures. The paper states that “a 
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balance between structure and flexibility is the best way to manage the contradicting demands 
of control and creativity faced by organizations in highly competitive environments”. 
Moreover, research argues that team-level processes influence individual improvisation 
through the quality of interaction. Behavioral integration and team cohesion positively affect 
improvisation: “The greater the integration and cohesion, the better team members are prepared 
to improvise on an individual-level.” (Magni, Proserpio, Hoegl & Provera, 2009). 
Finally, regarding the medical emergency context, empiric research has been made 
investigating improvisation inside the emergency room of a hospital. This investigation is based 
in the premise that, despite standardization and improvisation being seen as conflicting logics, 
they are not incompatible. Moreover, it concludes that “professionals respond both to macro-
institutional constraints and to the situational requirements they face in their everyday job 
requirements. (…) they defer to an institutional logic of standards, while in their institutional 
work they improvise.” The duality of the existence and non-existence of improvisation is 
attributed to pressures in the institutional domain, such as professional scrutiny, and practical 
needs emerging in the operational realm, such as patient variability (Baptista, Clegg, Cunha, 
Giustiniano and Rego, 2016). 
Prehospital medical care is part of emergency medicine, although the environment in which 
practitioners operate is quite different from the emergency room: “What makes pre-hospital 
care so unique is that the care is provided far away from medical support. The care is given in 
a changing and sometimes difficult environment. (…) Pre-hospital health-care providers use 
different kinds of vehicle and many types of equipment not relevant to the hospital setting. 
Other issues which make pre-hospital emergency care so unique is that the care is provided in 
an unstable environment, due to an uncontrolled volume of patients, a variable level of acuity, 
a lack of information, time sensitivity, stress and fatigue.” (Kovacs and Croskerry, 1999). For 
this reason, investigating decision making and improvisation in the out-of-hospital context may 
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bring relevant contributions to improvisation studies in highly structured environments. My 
research question is: How to articulate protocol and unexpected events? 
METHOD 
Research Context  
The research question was investigated within a highly protocolized professional activity, the 
prehospital medical care. This activity aims to assist victims of sudden illness or trauma. The 
emergency medical services can either provide treatment to those in need of urgent medical 
care and/or arranging for a timely transportation of the patient to the definitive care unit, usually 
a hospital. This activity relies in a consultation and articulation entity, that not only distributes 
work to the professionals that are spread and organized according to geographical areas, but 
also provide expert support in case there is not a doctor in the scene. This activity also relies in 
cognitive systems, for a standardized approach to each situation. The protocols encompass 
general approach systems, guidelines for specific diseases and traumas and expert consultation 
when needed. Health professionals often perform in articulation with the authorities and the 
extrication teams of firefighter’s units. Because of the nature of the activity, their performance 
is often constrained by time pressure. Additionally, the activity is characterized by recurrent 
minor and major incidents which can represent unexpected events. 
The focus of this work was in the process of successfully stabilizing and transporting patients 
or victims to the hospital. This study was applied to all differentiation levels of professionals in 
this field, namely technicians, nurses and doctors. The study includes professionals from the 
center region of Portugal, covering urban centers and countryside areas. It consists in the 
application of semi-structured interviews, and the subsequent treatment of the data through 
categorization and inductive reasoning.  
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Data Collection 
The data collection process was based on qualitative research methods. In total, 34 semi-
structured interviews were conducted. From those 26 were considered valid, as they narrated 
an episode in which there was an unexpected event triggering improvisational activities. I 
examined either episodes in which adaptations to the protocol were necessary for the 
professionals to complete their job in the most successful way possible, cases in which there 
was no protocol, or situations where the ideal resources were not available. The sample was 
composed by 10 technicians, 13 nurses and 3 doctors, with a geographical distribution of 6 
professionals from Lisbon, 14 from Viseu and the remaining from disperse areas. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face or by videoconference. 
The script of the semi-structured interview was built according to the Critical Incident 
Technique guidelines. After defining the aim of the activity and the plans and specifications, a 
list of open questions was made regarding the unfolding of the occurrence (Flanagan 1954). In 
addition to the interviews it was possible to speak informally with several professionals, to 
better understand the context, the organizational specificities and mechanisms. 
Analytical Approach 
The treatment of the data was based in the principles of inductive theory, combined with 
iteration between ethnographic data and theoretical constructs (Van Maanen, 1979). 
The Grounded Theory approach by Gioia is characterized by 3 stages of coding and 
categorization. In the first phase, I analyzed the interviews’ transcripts and developed a 
preliminary list of 84 descriptive codes using respondents’ terms. After seeking similarities and 
differences among these codes, it was possible to consolidate them into broader categories, 
reaching a more manageable number of 32 categories.  
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In the second stage a theoretical perspective is adopted, by reflecting upon the emerging themes 
and in the possible concepts they may suggest ‘to help us describe and explain the phenomena 
we are observing’ (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013). At this stage I took a descriptive 
perspective, identifying 6 factors that influence the perception-decision process by health 
professionals: cognitive systems, contextual evaluation, experience, social-material conditions, 
resources and self-preservation behaviors. Additionally, from an analytical point of view, I 
identified mindful processes that allow for adaptation: assessment of benefit and harm, risk 
level assessment, assessment of resources’ attributes, re-interpretation of resources, re-
evaluation of cognitive resources, unrelated knowledge sources. In total, this stage resulted in 
12 second order categories. 
Finally, in the third step the themes and concepts are merged into ‘second order aggregate 
dimensions’ (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013). Sensemaking mediators, assessment processes 
and adaptive processes are the third order dimensions in this study (Figure 1: Data Structure). 
Annex 1 consist of a table with proof quotes, first-order categories, second-order categories and 
third order dimensions. 
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Figure 1: Data Structure  
• Not to cause more damage 
• Victim’s age 
 
 
Assessment of benefit and harm 
Assessment 
First-order categories 
 
Second-order categories 
 
Third-order dimensions 
 
• Risk level professional 
• Risk level victim condition  
 
• Resources available 
 
 
Risk assessment 
Assessment of Resources 
assessment 
• Accumulated experience 
• Experience colleague 
•  
 
 
• Experience from different context 
• Common sense 
 
 • Additional measures precaution 
• Raising Social Awareness 
 
• Rearranging resources 
• Reordering processes 
• External consultation 
• Reorganizing routines 
• Transporting to closer health unit 
 
• Material and technologic available 
resources 
• Requesting others help 
 
Additional actions 
Re-evaluation of cognitive 
systems 
 
Unrelated knowledge source 
Re-interpretation of Resources 
Socio-cognitive systems 
Relativizing 
and re-
interpreting 
• Scenario reading 
• Understanding victim’s condition 
• Cooperative/Non-cooperative victim  
 
• Protected by differentiated protocol 
• Protected by regulator doctor 
prescription 
• Good reasoning behind decisions 
• Confidence in decisions 
• Others help 
• Others initiative 
• Others interference 
• Resources at hand 
•  
•  
 
Protocol 
• Validation 
• Internal consultation 
 
Experience 
Contextual Evaluation 
Social-Material Conditions 
Sensemaking 
Mediators 
Self-preservation measures and 
behaviors 
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FINDINGS 
The interpretative analysis was built on the insight that, in a highly-routinized context, 
unexpected events trigger sensemaking processes (Weick 1995). The first phase consists in a 
descriptive approach regarding the perception and decision process generalized to each episode. 
The factors influencing the process were identified, providing a list of concepts to reflect upon.  
By confronting the improvisational practices with the unexpected events, I concluded that for 
different triggers there were different acknowledging processes influencing the different 
solutions found. Therefore, it seemed interesting to situate the triggers in time and understand 
where do they fit in the decision process and the respective implications.  
Afterwards, it was possible to identify patterns and to understand that if the trigger of the 
adaptation was in the first phase, that adaptation would be characterized by specific mindful 
processes different from the ones originated by a trigger in the second phase. I observed that 
unexpected events may imply either a non-fit between protocols and the situation, or a non-fit 
between the resources available and the resources needed to apply the appropriate protocol. 
This leads to a split of the decision process in two different phases, each one corresponding to 
the questions ‘Is there a protocol? Do I follow that protocol?’ and ‘Do I have the resources?’. 
The organization of the concepts listed before resulted in a decision-perception framework, 
which allowed the sequent understanding of adaptive processes according to a procedural nature 
or a resource based nature. 
We identified two key facilitating processes leading to the improvisational practices. The ones 
that allow for the acknowledgement and understanding of the unexpected event were named 
‘assessment processes’. The ‘adaptive processes’ often start with the conclusions form the 
former and reflect the adaptation resulting from those (Figure 2). 
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            Figure 2: Sensemaking model 
 
Sensemaking mediators 
 
Sensemaking mediators are the factors found to influence the perception-decision process, 
which is divided in two often but not always sequential phases. 
Cognitive systems encompass the clinical guidelines that practitioners know by hard. They 
include general approaches and specific protocols. In situations that are not so easy to diagnose 
and decide treatment, there is a complementary knowledge transfer mechanism which allows 
practitioners in the field to share opinions and ask for expert advice. The consultation entity has 
‘regulating doctors’ that can both provide advice and request external advice, by establishing 
contact with the anti-poison department or the hospital that the patient is headed for instance. 
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For the less differentiated teams, the ones that do not include a physician, some protocols may 
require validation. The validation entity is responsible for confirming procedures such as drugs 
administration when the team is composed by a nurse and a technician. 
Both the victim’s assessment and the scenario reading are relevant for the understanding of 
victim’s clinical condition. For instance, in case of trauma, it is very important to look at the 
scenario: “if I see an accident in which the car glass has an application point from which it 
splinters, I know the person thumped his head in the glass even if he does not remember” 
(subject 20). Also, contextual evaluation provides information on the factors conditioning 
practitioners’ performance, such as safety conditions and interference of others.  
Experienced professionals have ‘outdoor’ repertoire which make their decisions faster and more 
suitable to the exceptional situations: “The experience comes from recognizing situations and 
over time developing action strategies for different typical cases” (Gunnarson and Stomberg, 
2009). Furthermore, research found the way information is interpreted and discussed vary 
among novices and experts. Experts differ from novices in clinical decision-making strategy by 
their ability to focus and be selective. In addition to their accumulated knowledge, expertise, 
and experience, experts organize their information into meaningful parts (Kassirer, 1989). 
The human and material resources available at the scene, or in a reachable distance, constitute 
the social material conditions. They include third parties present in the scene, as well as their 
belongings and tools. 
The articulation entity coordinates activities among different medical assistance means (e.g. 
ambulances, helicopters and medical vehicles), and with other operators, including police and 
firefighter units. Moreover, it can establish contact with the subsequent intervenient in the 
emergency medicine channel, usually the hospital that the patient is headed to. This contact 
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may have the goal of confirming the availability of a specific room or medical team needed for 
continuing the patient’s treatment. 
The results obtained in this phase are similar to results Gunnarsson and Stomberg (2009) 
obtained when interviewing ambulance’s nurses and investigating the factors influencing 
decision making. They divided the influencers in incident, external factors, communication and 
cooperation, knowledge, and ethical dilemmas. Where external factors encompass time and 
distances, security/threat and environment, and cooperation encompasses other operators and 
colleagues. 
Assessment Processes 
 
➢ Benefit-harm assessment  
 
After arriving at the scene of an accident, or at the place the patient is waiting, prehospital 
medical assistance professionals evaluate the victim condition and try to understand the 
scenario in order to have a clear idea of the victim’s state. In a regular situation, they think 
about the appropriate protocol for that situation and immediately apply it. However, some cases 
do not unfold in such way since practitioners need to take into account unusual circumstances.  
When there is something not found as planned, such as a trauma victim that had already been 
moved, practitioners may ponder whether the protocol is beneficial to the victim. In this case 
following the protocol could aggravate the victim’s condition. 
We decided only to lift the arm. There was no practical immobilization. And that was the 
transport with higher comfort to that victim. So, in that case I didn't follow the trauma protocol. 
Based on the complaints of the victim, we adapted to what there was. (...) Because the pain is 
a symptom. The pain causes big variations in the person's blood pressure, etc. It will entail 
everything. Subject 20 
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The decision is made combining the insights from the contextual evaluation with the 
accumulated experience of each practitioner. They analyze the extent to which the protocol fits 
the situation, and act accordingly.  
➢ Risk assessment  
 
The first issue to evaluate when arriving at the scene is whether the safety requirements are met. 
Only then the practitioners can step in and fulfill their mission. In the interviews, the two main 
types of threatening scenarios are the ones including violent patients or relatives and the ones 
consisting of car crashes. In some exceptional situations, practitioners decide to intervene even 
when the safety requirements are not met. For instance, when they find a victim in a very critical 
condition and they know if they wait they might lose that life. This is illustrated by this 
retrospective rationale: 
Because if we had applied the protocol, ideally, we should have waited by the extrication unit 
to tell us: “you can approach the victims”. But we also knew that if we did not do it at that time, 
there would be another fatal victim. (…) The main decision was if we would run the risk of 
approaching him inside the car without the safety conditions, because the vehicle was not 
stabilized. The extrication unit said that there was the risk of fire and explosion. Subject 13 
After the contextual evaluation, practitioners acknowledge consequences for the victim of not 
receiving medical care immediately, as well as the risk they take by providing that care without 
their safety guaranteed. Their decision is based in a comparative ponderation between the two. 
If the risk for the victim is high and the perceived risk for the practitioner is low, they may 
decide it is worthy to intervene. 
But, although we must respect all safety requirements, we know that when we do not respect, 
some may bring bigger risks than others. If there is a house burning, and it is not viable for us 
to go inside for instance; if there are an electrocuted and we have no means to know if the 
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electricity is already off. There are situations in which we have more risk or less risk. Subject 
13 
➢ Resources attributes assessment  
 
After deciding they have conditions to provide medical care and what is the appropriate protocol 
for the situation, the next step is to put it in practice. However, there were several interviews 
reporting lack of the resources needed to accomplish that, such as materials and medications 
not available or communication systems’ failures. Practitioners must consider the attributes of 
the resources needed so they can find those attributes in the resources available.  
We were supposed to have an expert kit for doing tourniquets in members, which at the moment 
we did not had yet. (…) The venous tourniquets never do a good tourniquet as it would be 
necessary in that case, so what we used was a bandage. It's the way we have of containing a 
big bleeding, as it was the case. (...) It was the best option to keep the bleeding under control. 
Subject 29 
The I-care system [communication system] was not working (…) We needed to send an ECG to 
the consulting entity, because we needed their opinion to know what we should do. (…) By 
chance I had my personal phone with me, I had cellphone internet, and so I took a photo to the 
electrocardiogram and I sent it to 3 colleagues I knew that were working in the consultation 
entity in that moment. Subject 19 
A spectator was there, and had a box of a warning triangle (the ones that need to be used in 
case of accident). Those boxes are moraless rigid, and we used it to immobilize the arm. (...) 
"this is already immobilized, it might not be with a wood splint but it is with a plastic splint." 
It's the same (...) That was well done and functional. Subject 10 
Even if this is not a conscious rationale, it is implied in the description of the episodes. 
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Often those are things of the moment. We don’t even know how we remember those things. But 
if they are there, it happens. Subject 19 
 
Adaptive processes: Relativizing and Re-interpreting 
 
Before describing and analyzing adaptive processes, it is important to note that self-protection 
measures and behaviors are a priority for practitioners.  
When it is possible to apply the protocol but medical assistance professionals decide not to, 
they always adopt self-protection practices and behaviors. For technicians, the protocol says 
when the patient does not breathe, it must be assumed the heart does not beat, therefore it 
prescribes ventilations and compressions. The is an example of an episode in which technicians 
could feel the pulse so they did not perform the compressions with the intent of not causing 
harm. They asked for differentiated support – a doctor and a nurse – and they acted protected 
by their protocol, which did not include the compressions. 
The consultation entity may have an important role in this matter since when there is not a 
doctor in the scene, technicians and nurses may adapt or extend to protocol with the validation 
of the doctor providing advice. It works like a prescription made by a doctor inside a hospital, 
but it is recorded by phone instead of paper. 
Even when there is no validation, that typically happens for one of two reasons: either the 
practitioner has confidence in what his doing and has a good reasoning behind the decision, or 
the validation is not possible for communication’s failures and the practitioner is confident in 
that practice as well. This confidence comes mostly from accumulated experience. 
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➢ Substitution of task knowledge: Unrelated knowledge sources 
 
For the unexpected events that cannot be related with a protocol, the solutions found may be 
based on experience from contexts that are not related with prehospital assistance. Common 
sense may arise as a tool for handling that kind of situations. For instance, appealing to family 
in situations of victims that do not want to collaborate. When facing a Social Emergency 
situation, in which there is an old lady that lives in conditions of “extreme insalubrity”, and that 
person resists the transportation to the hospital. Practitioners must convince the lady without 
any kind of guidelines or training. A strategy that is described is asking for a relative help, 
someone that is a reference for the patient. Additionally, in episodes consisting of suicide 
attempts, it may be necessary to calm the victim down, and the strategy used is making the 
person feel understood instead of criticized. Asking for the motives and letting the person talk. 
Besides, it is common to appeal to the positive side of life, such as the family. 
Personal experience is also a useful tool in this kind of episodes. For instance, an unknow dog 
may represent an obstacle to the prehospital assistance by impeding the access to the victim. 
The person is question has a strategy to approach unknown dogs that comes from previous 
experiences. The action of getting down on our knees is described as having a calming effect 
on dogs, making them feel confidence in that person.  
➢ Adapting to exceptional situation: Re-evaluation of cognitive systems 
 
There may be two motives triggering this process: the protocol can be applied but it is not 
beneficial for the victim, the procedures could be a source of pain for the victim and aggravate 
her condition; or it is impossible to apply the protocol because of patients’ characteristics and 
clinical conditions, for instance the fact that a patient is over weighted implying he does not fit 
in a stretcher or in the ambulance in the usual way. Another victim’s characteristic relevant to 
the viability and adaptation of protocols is the patient being under 18 years-old. In case of 
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children, not only the procedures can be more traumatizing/damaging for the victim, but they 
are also more difficult to the practitioners since the scale is smaller and the victim does not 
cooperate as an adult.  
Because professionals learn the principles and evidence used in the creation of algorithms 
(Kovacs and Croskerry 1999), they can flexibly arrange them in accordance to victim’s 
condition and characteristics, external factors, or resource constraints. 
- Rearranging resources 
This process is often triggered by situations in which the protocol cannot be applied. However, 
the principles behind the guidelines in the protocol are taken into account and reproduced in the 
closest way possible. There is an adaption of resources in the most adjusted way possible. 
Usually if there is a lower limb fracture, we put one [splint] on each side, so that the leg is 
immobilized. In that situation, I had to put splints like this [draws triangle shape] – almost a 
carpentry job. (…) It was an adaptation from a normal to an exceptional situation, and is one 
of those in which we had no other option. We couldn’t align the injured limb because there was 
resistance in every way we tried to move it. Subject 1 
The patient was a big big lady, she weighted about 180 kilos. (...) There is no protocol for 
transportation of overweight patients. (…) There was a problem: the lady did not fit inside the 
ambulance as a regular patient. (…) There was a jump regarding the security protocol, because 
the lady should be seated. She couldn’t be lying down for being able to breathe better. But we 
did not have the support to hold her standing, she did not fit the regular stretcher. So, we put 
on top of the stretcher the reinforced one [that was holding the lady] and we tied them together 
with the stretcher’s ribbons. And all the material we had and that could not break was arranged 
to support the lady. There was also a person sustaining the stretcher from behind, during the 
transportation. (…) The security conditions were improvised. Subject 5 
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- Reordering Processes 
Sometimes it is beneficial for the victim to skip a step and then come back to it later. Situations 
in which the evaluation of the victim cannot be made as usual, for instance because the victim 
does not cooperate. It is necessary to take measures when practitioners cannot make sense of 
the situation as usual.  
Moreover, when it is not possible to validate some step, because of problems such as network 
failures, and when the practitioners are confident that step is necessary for the completion of 
the medical assistance, they perform it. As soon as they have the opportunity, they inform the 
consulting entity. This is valid for initiating transports without having a destination defined, or 
for administering a medication (in the case of nurses) that the practitioner knows is critical for 
the victim stabilization. 
The protocol says "you initiate transportation after communicating the data to the articulation 
entity. With the destination already defined" (…) What I did was initiating transportation 
without informing the entity, because I had no means to do it. (...) I got signal after 15 minutes, 
so we stopped before entering the highway and waited for validation. Subject 17   
Upon our arrival, the victim was agitated and non-cooperative. At the time, we could not 
understand what was wrong with him. The only parameter we could evaluate was the blood 
pressure, and it was quite high. (...) We have not always been able to ask for differentiated 
support with only this information (...) The protocol was the normal course of action: evaluating 
the victim. We have not been able to evaluate exhaustively, as we do with most victims. With 
only a little bit of information, very little, we managed to jump a step and then come back to 
complete it. Subject 22 
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Reordering work has been defined by previous research as “changing the sequence in which 
pieces of the overall project were completed”. Professionals leverage on their knowledge of the 
work progression (Becky and Okhuysen, 2011). 
- External consultation 
The internal consultation, provided by the consulting entity, is a common organizational 
practice integrated in the protocol. On the other hand, in some especial cases the consultation 
might be external. For instance, when the victim has a medical history regarding the condition 
presented, there may exist a professional that follows her and is familiar with the situation. In 
those cases, the consulting entity might establish contact with that professional, typically a 
doctor, to ask for directives regarding procedures such as doses for drugs administration 
She basically had an extremely fast heartbeat. (…) Our protocol for the treatment of this kind 
of rhythms specifically is a protocol only for adults. (…) her mother had the number of the 
cardiologist following her in Coimbra. The coordination entity doctor agreed to talk to him. 
(...) The doctor indicated what was the doses and took the responsibility for that doses out of 
our protocol. He promptly said "Based on her age, her weight and on her medical history - 
there had been recurrent situations - you must administrate x dose". Subject 18 
➢ Substitution of Materials and requesting the help of others: Re-interpretation of 
Resources 
 
This process contraposes the ideal resources’ characteristics to the social-material conditions in 
the scene. In this way professionals find the best alternative option available. All the examples 
given in the resources assessment section are examples of substitution of material and 
technological resources. The alternatives found encompass professional belongings (bandages), 
personal belongings (cellphone), or third-parties’ belongings (triangle box). 
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Besides, there is the possibility that something along the process of providing medical care does 
not unfold as usual. For instance, difficulties may arise in reaching the scene or the place in 
which the victim is waiting. Also, it happens the medical team is occupied with the victim and 
there is some additional task to do, such as recovering a limb that was amputated, that requires 
the manipulation of uncommon tools such as the machines in a quarry. Moreover, there may be 
material resources needed for the assistance that are not included in the medical team’s material 
but are usually available next to the scene. For instance, ice can be found in any restaurant or 
bar. Therefore, resources may be allocated to actions that escape the aim of prehospital 
assistance. 
We received the address by phone. When we arrive there, we went through the street twice, we 
asked people where was that door number, and no one knew. Everyone confirmed the street 
name, that is, the street and the district was right. The only thing that was wrong was the door 
number, it didn’t exist. And we knew the door were inside the condominium, which was new, it 
was one month old. So, we made an entire poor district (bairro social) searching for the door 
and being our guide. Subject 19 
It was the ambulance team itself, together with the GNR and the rest of the workers who came 
to the construction site in the meantime, that were able to go to the machine and take the arm 
off. Subject 29 
When we have an amputated limb, we should put it in a bag and then wrap it in ice. And we do 
not have ice in the ambulance. But we managed, together with firefighters, to get it. We were 
close to a hotel or resort or something like that, and we were able to mobilize people to go to 
the hotel to order ice, and we got lots of ice. These are things that we end up having to turn to 
other people because we really do not have at the place. Subject 29 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this study are aligned with the findings of Kovacs and Croskerry (2009) which 
define critical thinking in emergency medicine as “the intellectually disciplined process of 
actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating 
information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning or 
communication, as a guide to belief or action” (Croskerry et al, 2009). 
This work sheds light on the micro mechanisms that constitute the sensemaking route of the 
articulation of protocols and unexpected events, and it emphasizes improvisational outcomes. 
It is proposed that the process of improvisation in a highly standardized organizational 
environment includes assessment and adaptive processes that confront protocols with 
situational specific context.  
The assessment stage may include a benefit-harm ponderation, risk comparative ponderation, 
resources attributes analysis or every possible combination of this processes. In the case of the 
first and the last one, being aware of the principles behind mental models allows for a 
confrontation with reality that results in a quantification of their compatibility. Regarding risk 
comparative ponderation, there is a comparative confrontation of the perceived potential impact 
for the victim against potential risk for the health professional. The processes described are not 
always the result of a structured reasoning process. Therefore, they may in part be related with 
contextual rationality concept, which assumes that the significance of an action (as a rational 
action) may depend on the context, rather than on a full awareness of the reasons or a causal 
efficacy reasoning (Townley, 2008).  
The stage encompassing relativizing and re-interpreting processes allows for the achievement 
of a solution according to the results of the assessment stage. It may include the replacement of 
task knowledge with sources unrelated with medicine, the re-evaluation of mental models that 
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allows the shape of protocols according to situation, and the re-interpretation of material and 
human resources available at the scene. Once again, it is essential to know the principles behind 
protocols for the decision making in this phase. While the assessment stage is cognitive, this 
stage may imply the action at the same time as a solution comes up in the practitioners’ mind. 
Therefore, the first phase that consists of acknowledging the unexpected event is comparable 
to ‘a diagnoses’, and the second which comprises the achievement of a solution is comparable 
to the ‘treatment’. 
Results show that contextual perception and assessment processes, together with experience, 
are the basis for adaptation and improvisational practices in a high structured and standardized 
procedure environment. Principles such as constant re-evaluation and contraposition of 
contextual information and protocols’ principles play a determinant role in successful 
improvisation. Therefore, if organizations want to promote a flexible but reasoned approach to 
protocols they may foster the learning of the principles in which guidelines were built on. In 
contexts in which guidelines are not taught in school as it happens with nurses and doctors, this 
may be costly to achieve. In those cases, organizations could promote periodical revision of 
guidelines so employees could reason and discuss about the practices and the why’s. 
The methodology used brought some difficulties found along the development of this study. 
Regarding the institutions that employ prehospital care professionals, it was difficult to attain a 
formal authorization to perform the study, and the observational internship that could 
complement the data from interviews was not allowed. Additionally, few professionals 
volunteered for the study, which turned the sample into a convenience sample (even if partially). 
Unfortunately, there is not a balance regarding the different differentiation levels of 
professionals composing the sample.  
In fact, results show there are differences between technicians and more differentiated 
professionals, namely nurses and doctors, regarding the feedback on the importance of 
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experience, the team dynamics and the understanding of improvisation as an exceptional tool. 
Investigating the two group separately could bring relevant insights.  
Moreover, it would be interesting to make a comparable study including successful and 
unsuccessful events to find out more about these assessment and adaptation mechanisms and to 
highlight differences between successful and unsuccessful episodes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Even in highly protocolized organizational settings, improvisation can have a crucial role in the 
daily achievement of goals and successful fulfillment of the organizational purpose.  
Contextual evaluation is a crucial step for adopting a flexible perspective on organizational 
guidelines. The confrontation of reality with mental models is the basis the development of 
practices that reflect a pondered adjustment of protocols. However, there is a pre-requisite for 
this process to work, which is that practitioners know the principles behind guidelines. As such, 
organizations must promote a culture that stresses the knowledge about those principles. 
Moreover, the assessment processes that allow for contextual evaluation are not always 
structured and fully rational: organizations should promote the discussion on the decision-
making mechanisms and variables that constitute these processes as a route for increased 
awareness and critical thinking. 
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ANNEX 1  
 
Proof Quotes Table 
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Proof Quotes 1st order 
categories 
2nd order 
categories 
3rd order 
dimensions 
(14) Since a short-time ago, our protocols 
do not differentiate between only stop 
ventilating and the heart stopping. So, if 
patient does not breathe we have to 
assume the heart does not beat. (…) We 
will do ventilations and compressions - 
causing pressure on the chest. Let us 
think: If the heart is beating with a certain 
rhythm and I am compressing, what am I 
doing? (...) we worked around the 
protocol not to cause more damage.  
(20) So, we decided only to suspend/lift the 
arm, there was no practical 
immobilization. And that was the 
transport with higher comfort to that 
victim. So, in that case I didn't follow the 
trauma protocol. Based on the complaints 
of the victim, we adapted to what there 
was. (...) We are the ones that must adapt 
to the victim, not the victim to us. Because 
the pain is a symptom. The pain causes big 
variations in the person's blood pressure, 
etc. It will entail everything. 
 
Not to cause more 
damage 
Assessment of 
benefit and 
harm 
 
Assessment 
(7) Because it is a child, often we 
ponderate a little bit more. (…) it is more 
traumatizing for a child than for an adult. 
(28) When the victim is a child, we nurses 
go as well more apprehensive, more 
anxious, because obviously access a vein 
in a child is much more difficult than in 
an adult. In the children, they are not so 
visible, they have a much smaller caliber. 
And then there is the cry, the screams, the 
ward off.  
 
Victim’s age 
(13) [we followed the protocol] except for 
the safety requirements, which is the first 
question we must evaluate: if we have the 
conditions to act. But, although we must 
respect all safety requirements, we know 
that when we do not respect, some may 
bring bigger risks than others. If there is a 
house burning, and it is not viable for us 
to go inside for instance; if there are an 
electrocuted and we have no means to 
know if the electricity is already off. There 
are situations in which we have more risk 
or less risk. 
 
Risk level 
professional 
Risk level 
assessment 
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(13) Because if we applied the protocol, 
ideally, we should have waited by the 
extrication unit to tell us: “you can 
approach the victims”. But we also knew 
that if we did not do it at that time, there 
would be another fatal victim. (…) The 
main decision was if we would run the risk 
of approaching him inside the car without 
the safety conditions, because the vehicle 
was not stabilized. The extrication unit 
said that there was the risk of fire and 
explosion. 
 
Risk level victim 
(15) 'We need to do a tourniquet. What 
materials are available? There is this 
instrument which is necessary.' We 
proceeded to that in the most adjusted way 
possible.  
(29) We supposedly have an XPTO kit for 
doing tourniquets in members, which at 
the moment we did not had yet. (...) we 
ended up having to resort to bandages. In 
this case, we used bandages to contain the 
hemorrhage. (…) As those are situations 
that happen [regularly], we typically 
evade the protocol. The venous 
tourniquets never do a good tourniquet as 
it would be necessary in that case, so what 
we used was a bandage. It's the way we 
have of containing a big bleeding, as it 
was the case. (...) we had to opt by the 
bandage. It was the best option to keep the 
bleeding under control. 
 
Resources 
assessment 
Resources’ 
attributes 
assessment 
(10) A spectator was there, and had a box 
of a warning triangle (the ones that need 
to be used in case of accident). Those 
boxes are moraless rigid, and we used it 
to immobilize the arm. (...) "this is already 
immobilized, it might not be with a wood 
splint but it is with a plastic splint." It's the 
same (...) That was well done and 
functional.  
(19) By chance I had my personal phone 
with me, I had cellphone internet, and so I 
took a photo to the electrocardiogram and 
I sent it to 3 colleagues I knew that were 
working in the consultation entity in that 
moment. One of them immediately opened 
my message, asked about it, and from that 
moment onwards I got his attention. I 
started to talk to him: “Look, I am in 
ambulance x, region y, the I-care 
Material and 
technologic 
available 
resources 
Re-
interpretation 
of resources 
Relativizing 
and re-
interpreting 
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[communication system] is not working 
and so I am sending you the ECG. Please 
go to the doctor’s office and show it to 
him.” And he did as I said. (…) 
(19) We received the address by phone. 
When we arrive there we went through the 
street twice, we asked people where was 
that door number, and no one knew. 
Everyone confirmed the street name, that 
is, the street and the district was right. The 
only thing that was wrong was the door 
number, it didn’t exist. And we knew the 
door were inside the condominium, which 
was new, it was one month old. So we 
made an entire poor district (bairro 
social) searching for the door and being 
our guide. 
(29) when we have an amputated limb, we 
should put it in a bag and then wrap it in 
ice. And we do not have ice in the 
ambulance. But we managed, together 
with firefighters, to get it. We were close 
to a hotel or resort or something like that, 
and we were able to mobilize people to go 
to the hotel to order ice, and we got lots of 
ice. These are things that we end up 
having to turn to other people because we 
really do not have at the place. 
 
Requesting others 
help 
(1) Usually if there is a lower limb 
fracture, we put one [splint] on each side, 
so that the leg is immobilized. In that 
situation I had to put splints like this 
[draws triangle shape] – almost a 
carpentry job. (...) It was an adaptation 
from a normal to an exceptional situation, 
and is one of those in which we had no 
other option. We couldn’t align the 
injured limb because there was resistance 
in every way we tried to move it.     
(5) The patient was a big big lady, she 
weighted about 180 kilos. (...) There is no 
protocol for transportation of overweight 
patients. (…) There was a problem: the 
lady did not fit inside the ambulance as a 
regular patient. (…) There was a jump 
regarding the security protocol, because 
the lady should be seated. She couldn’t be 
lying down for being able to breathe 
better. But we did not have the support to 
hold her standing, she did not fit the 
regular stretcher. So, we put on top of the 
stretcher the reinforced one [that was 
Rearranging 
resources 
Re-
evaluation of 
cognitive 
systems 
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holding the lady] and we tied them 
together with the stretcher’s ribbons. And 
all the material we had and that could not 
break was arranged to support the lady. 
There was also a person sustaining the 
stretcher from behind, during the 
transportation. (…) The security 
conditions were improvised. 
 
(17) The protocol says "you initiate 
transportation after communicating the 
data to the articulation entity. With the 
destination already defined" (…) What I 
did was initiating transportation without 
informing the entity, because I had no 
means to do it. (...) I got signal after 15 
minutes, so we stopped before entering the 
highway and waited for validation.      
(22) Upon our arrival, the victim was 
agitated and non-cooperative. At the time, 
we could not understand what was wrong 
with him. The only parameter we could 
evaluate was the blood pressure, and it 
was quite high. (...) We have not always 
been able to ask for differentiated support 
with only this information (...) The 
protocol was the normal course of action: 
evaluating the victim. We have not been 
able to evaluate exhaustively, as we do 
with most victims. With only a little bit of 
information, very little, we managed to 
jump a step and then come back to 
complete it. 
 
Reordering 
Processes 
(18) She basically had an extremely fast 
heartbeat. (…) Our protocol for the 
treatment of this kind of rhythms 
specifically is a protocol only for adults. 
(…) her mother has the number of the 
cardiologist following her in Coimbra. 
The coordination entity doctor agreed to 
talk to him. (...) The doctor indicated what 
was the doses and took the responsibility 
for that doses out of our protocol. He 
promptly said "Based on her age, her 
weight and on her medical history - there 
had been recurrent situations - you must 
administrate x dose." 
 
External 
Consultation 
(16) We knew the patient had a TCE and 
in Viseu we did not had response from 
neurosurgery. The idea was to contact the 
articulation entity to lead us, or to call an 
Reorganizing 
routines 
6 
 
heli, to Coimbra. (…) But I tried to 
intubate him and I couldn’t. (…) “In this 
condition, the patient will not arrive at the 
hospital in Viseu alive, he will drown in 
blood.” (…) We have another kind of 
tubes, called laryngeal masks, that do not 
completely protect the airway but they 
help to ventilate patients. And that was the 
decision: “I don’t have the airway assured 
so I cannot transport to Coimbra, but at 
least I will arrive to Viseu.” 
 
(7) A two year old child had an object in 
the lungues that later was confirmed to be 
a been. (…) Regarding that clinical 
condition, we should do the orotracheal 
intubation and make the transportation 
with ventilation. It was not possible to 
intubate (…) we opted to transport to 
Viseu hospital, there was a specialized 
team ready to intervene. (…) And then she 
had to go to Coimbra’s pediatric hospital. 
 
Transporting to 
closer health unit 
(2) [the bus] got inside the premises of a 
house. The owners were not home and 
there were two dogs that approached us. 
(...) I got down, why? Because everytime I 
have to face an unknown dog, I do that. 
When I get down the dogs feel confidence. 
(...) I always do it when I have some risky 
situation with a dog.  
(26) it was a truly improvised situation, 
because I was saying what I would say if 
I was in a bar with a sad friend. Because 
in terms of training there are nothing to 
guide us on that. (…) build an empathic 
connection. 
 
Experience from 
different contexts 
Unrelated 
knowledge 
sources 
(26) in our training the psychiatric 
breakouts are approached very 
superficially. And we work a lot with 
common sense and we try to find the 
words, not the best words, but the words 
that will cause less harm. Because 
everything you could say can trigger a 
reaction in a person that is already 
emotionally unstable. You must work that 
part without having the tools. At the 
moment, I thought I was being futile with 
phrases such as 'Não faça isso', 'Não 
queira acabar com a sua vida'. To see 
which one would result. (…) ‘Think about 
your family’ 
Common Sense 
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(30) It is not written anywhere how we 
should persuade a person to go to the 
hospital. It must be our strategy, our 
ability at that moment to pick up on 
certain points that we think can make her 
go to the hospital. Let's see if she's very 
attached to any relative. Usually this 
family member can convince her. (...) We 
give our opinion, try to be truthful and 
explain "it is better to go to the hospital 
for this and this" but many times when 
they are not so receptive with us we try to 
find someone of reference. 
 
(21) it was not a medical emergency once 
again, it was a social one. (…) this man 
was transported by us to the day care 
institution were he would usually go. And 
we went there to identify what we have 
seen at the house, which is an atypical 
situation. This does not happen regularly. 
(...) we did not transport to the hospital 
but we did not left him at home either. (…) 
It was not our job to take to the hospital a 
person that is stable, that has no health 
problem. He would go to the hospital, to 
the doctor, then he would be discharged 
and everything would come back to what 
it was before. 
 
Raising Social 
Awareness 
Additional 
actions 
(31) After talking with the regulator 
doctor there was medication administered 
that was not part of the protocol. (…) We 
administered a diuretic drug, frozemide, 
in order to diminish the intracranial 
hemorrhage that we suspected. Either an 
hemorrhage or an edema, there was 
something doing a mass effect. (…) In the 
intra-hospital context we would use 
manitol, the first line diuretic drug. 
Frozemide is used for pulmonary edemas. 
 
Additional 
measures 
(14) Since a short-time ago, our protocols 
do not differentiate between only stop 
ventilating and the heart stopping. So, if 
patient does not breathe we have to 
assume the heart does not beat. (…) We 
will do ventilations and compressions - 
causing pressure on the chest. Let us 
think: If the heart is beating with a certain 
rhythm and I am compressing, what am I 
doing? (...) we worked around the 
protocol not to cause more damage. (…) 
Protected by 
differentiated 
protocol 
Self-
preservation 
measures 
and 
behaviors 
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And that was what I did not do. According 
to the protocol I should have done it, but I 
didn’t. Meanwhile the doctor and nurse 
team arrived, and they did not do that 
either. And we carried on with what me 
and my colleague were doing, but 
protected by their protocol. 
 
(31) If the regulator doctor tells you “do 
this” and you know that adds value, I think 
no one will decline. In the end it is a 
medical prescription, even if is by phone, 
because the calls are recorded.  If 
something happens is the same thing as in 
the hospital when a doctor makes a 
prescription in paper or in the IT system. 
 
Protected by 
regulator doctor 
prescription 
(20) There, the surface wouldn't be 
favorable. But you have to know how to 
justify your decisions. If I arrive to the 
hospital and someone ask me: "this man 
fall 3 meters and you didn't immobilize 
him, why?" I have to know how to 
argument and justify my non-
immobilization. 
 
Good reasoning 
behind decision 
(25) I was thinking about other situations 
because it would not be expected that in 
that time, it was not described on the 
literature that that happens. My colleague 
tried to understand... He was also finding 
it weird, but then we tried to understand 
the background of the person. (…) [The 
most important factor was] the experience 
[of colleague]. I think it was fundamental 
because if I was alone, from my 
experience, I would immediately start to 
look for new answers instead of waiting. 
(28) The doctor I was with helped me 
diminishing the anxiety and stress levels, 
because he was a very experienced doctor 
in the area of pre-hospital assistance, 
despite being quite young. (…) The fact 
that I was accompanied with the person I 
was. I knew that, if not me, it would be 
him. One of us would be able to establish 
a venous access, wherever it was. 
 
Experience 
colleague 
Experience 
 
Sensemaking 
Mediators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(17) Network failures (…) Difficulty to 
validating protocol. (…) Often I know 
where the patient must go, but in the last 
week… I had a situation in which I 
initiated transport with an infarct. I did it 
Accumulated 
experience 
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because I knew the patient should go to 
Vila Real. However, Vila Real had to 
accept the patient. I rode 20 minutes 
before being able to establish contact with 
the articulation entity. (…) My decision 
was based on the experience of what 
comes next: either the adequate 
destination unit or knowing that the 
validation/articulation entity would do 
exactly as I did.  
(29) It comes from the things we are used 
to do. Because we have had several cases 
of trauma in which, if static tourniquets 
(as they are called) do not exist, which are 
ideal for the situation, we had already 
improvised with bandages in other 
situations. As we got good results, we 
grabbed that. 
(31) I did the diazepam suggestion to 
control the motor response. The diuretic 
medication was suggested right after by 
the doctor. I have not thought about that. 
Experience can sometimes trick us. You 
are formatted to a certain medication in 
the hospital context, and because you 
don’t have it in the outdoor context, you 
do not remember you have another one 
that can do the same effect by a different 
route. It is not what you call ‘first line’, 
but you can also use it. 
 
(27) No one tells us when we should move 
a victim inside the ambulance. Sometimes 
we have aggressive relatives of the victim, 
or we have hostile environments 
surrounding us, and even with a victim in 
PCR with a doctor on his way, the best for 
the victim and for us is to move her inside 
the ambulance. It is the responsibility of 
the team leader to manage these 
situations: evaluate the scenario, all the 
variables, and decide in the moment. 
 
Scenario Reading Contextual 
Evaluation 
(20) While my colleague approached the 
victim right away, I went to the scene and 
wanted them to explain me 'by the book' 
how and where did the victim fall. The 
cinematic of the trauma is very important. 
For instance, 
if I see an accident in which the car glass 
has an application point from which it 
splinters, I know the person thumped his 
Understanding 
victim’s 
condition 
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head in the glass even if he does not 
remember”  
 
(21) Based on what we could observe in a 
first impact, when we saw the house. That 
is, when you see medication spread 
around the house, several boxes of the 
same medication, you understand it is not 
organized. (…) If she does not follow the 
therapy, she does not take the medication, 
that is, she is not oriented to take the 
medication on time. Then she is in a risky 
situation.  
 
(26) The fact that I tried to read the person 
even before approaching her and I did not 
found her threatening. The external factor 
[influencing the episode] was the scenario 
reading, which is the second thing we do. 
After being sure the safety conditions are 
met, we see everything around us and try 
to understand without anyone telling it to 
us, what could have happened there. 
 
Cooperative/Non-
cooperative 
victim 
(24) The young man condition aggravates 
to cardiorespiratory arrest and his mother 
initiates resuscitation maneuvers guided 
by me. [One relevant factor for the success 
in this episode was] the fact that the 
mother collaborated. 
(29) When we have an amputated limb, we 
should put it in a bag and then wrap it in 
ice. And we do not have ice in the 
ambulance. But we managed, together 
with firefighters, to get it. We were close 
to a hotel or resort or something like that, 
and we were able to mobilize people to go 
to the hotel to order ice, and we got lots of 
ice. These are things that we end up 
having to turn to other people because we 
really do not have at the place. 
 
Others Help Social 
Material 
Conditions 
(27) When we took him out of the car, in 
those few minutes we were doing 
maneuvers, we had 'mirones', we had a lot 
of people looking at the scene. It was in a 
complementary itinerary very busy in 
terms of traffic. And one of the decisions I 
had to make, which was a bit hard for me 
was: do I put him inside the ambulance, or 
not? 
 
Others 
Interference 
(10) Someone had thought about it before 
me, and I took the hint: a spectator was Others Initiative 
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there, and had a box of a warning triangle 
(the ones that need to be used in case of 
accident) (…) He was actually already 
holding the triangle box in his hand, with 
that intent [of doing the immobilization]. 
He approached me and askes “-Do you 
think this can work?”, and I answered “-I 
think so, and that is very well thought.” 
 
(29) We had the advantage of establishing 
an efficient tourniquet because the people 
that were at the scene, who probably had 
knowledge of first aid, established a 
tourniquet previously. That helped that 
ours was efficient. 
 
(15) 'We need to do a tourniquet. What 
materials are available? There is this 
instrument which is necessary.' We 
proceeded to that in the most adjusted way 
possible. 
(19) There are a lot of stuff we do around 
protocol because we do not have material 
that would be useful to have.  
Resources at 
hand/ available 
 
(27) Protocols are those guidelines, that if 
we follow at the right moment, often allow 
us to keep the victims as safe as possible. 
I see them that way, they give us security. 
 
Protocols Socio-
cognitive 
systems 
(21) Social Emergency (…) That depends 
also on who is in the other side of the line, 
in the validation entity. If that person 
allows for that articulation or not, 
because this was not our role. But it was 
not our job either to take to the hospital a 
person that is stable, that has no health 
problems. He would go to the hospital, to 
the doctor, then he would be discharged 
and everything would come back to what 
it was before. 
(17) Difficulty to validate protocol. (…) I 
initiated transportation without 
validation, cause I had no means to 
communicate with validation/articulation 
entity. In this kind of situations, they 
understand and do not raise any 
problems. (…) It is influenced by the 
security they feel in your voice [when you 
communicate your decision]. 
 
Validation 
(31) A medication for stabilizing the motor 
response was administered. It was a 
borderline procedure in terms of protocol, 
Internal 
consultation 
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because it depends on how you understand 
the situation. If the motor response he was 
having was the result of a convulsive 
process, I would not need medical 
orientation to administer the drug. If I 
understood that could be something else… 
There is a frame of the episode that is 
relevant in this context. I thought I should 
talk to the doctor before the procedure.  
(31) After talking with the regulator 
doctor there was medication administered 
that was not part of the protocol. (…) It 
was an orientation from the regulator 
doctor. I suggested the diazepam to 
control the motor response. The diuretic 
medication was suggested right after by 
the doctor. I have not thought about that.  
 
 
